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Abstract
One of the significant developments in the last four decades of economics is
the growing empirical evidence that individual consumption preferences, as mea-
sured by self-reported life satisfaction, are neither fixed nor self-centred but are
instead overwhelmingly dominated by externalities, partly in the form of reference
levels set by others and by one’s own experience. Welfare analysis recognising
this fact is likely to indicate enormous revisions for macroeconomic policy and
social objectives as well as for what is taught in economics at all levels. Yet the
task of constructing general equilibrium models based on this microeconomic re-
ality is still in its infancy. In this work I take the conventional stance that decision
makers understand their own utility function. Therefore, they can choose the mi-
lieu in which they immerse themselves with the sophisticated understanding that
it will affect their own consumption reference levels and therefore the degree of
satisfaction they derive from their private consumption. At the same time, their
private consumption will help to set the reference level for others in their chosen
group. I treat theoretically the problem of such endogenous formation of consump-
tion reference groups in the context of a simultaneous choice of neighbourhoods
and home consumption amongst a heterogenous population. For both discrete and
continuous distributions of types, I find general equilibrium outcomes in which
differentiation of neighbourhoods occurs endogenously and I compare the welfare
implications of growth in such economies.
∗Thanks to Chris Bidner, Peter Burton, Mukesh Eswaran, Patrick Francois, John Helliwell, and Ken
Jackson for helpful discussion. This work was supported by a SSHRC graduate fellowship and by the
Canadian Institute for Advanced Research’s program on Social Interactions, Identity and Well-Being.
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Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, there-
fore, by society and by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Be-
cause they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature. ... A house
may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small
it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But let a palace arise beside
the little house, and it shrinks from a little house to a hut ... the occupant
of the relatively small house will feel more and more uncomfortable, dis-
satisfied and cramped within its four walls. [Marx and Engels, 1848, p.
163]1
1 Introduction
A number of studies have shown large negative externalities in individual subjective
well-being due to neighbours’ income [Luttmer, 2005, Kingdon and Knight, 2007,
Barrington-Leigh and Helliwell, 2007]. These externalities appear to reflect the role
of nearby households as reference groups acting in individuals’ reference-dependent
preferences over income or consumption. At the same time, there are many reasons
to expect positive spillovers from having prosperous neighbours. For instance, the
quantity of tax-funded public goods and certain forms of social capital spillovers can be
expected to be correlated with the incomes of nearby residents and thus to generate an
apparent empathy effect. Alternatively, an idea pursued in this work is that neighbours’
income may contribute to a local status level enjoyed by the entire neighbourhood, for
instance through conspicuous displays of affluence.
An unresolved question is how such opposing positive and negative externalities of
others’ income relate to each other. It may, for instance, be that one effect is concen-
trated on a finer geographic scale than the other. In this work, I consider the possibility
that individuals are fully aware of the structure of such returns. The motivating ques-
tions are then, firstly: when households properly anticipate the importance of reference
groups and have some choice over where they live, can the simultaneous choice of
whom to associate with and how much to consume lead to self-organisation of het-
erogeneous individuals into differentiated groups? Secondly, in a world in which such
comparison effects are dominant, will a policy maker wish to curtail production of the
status good or the freedom to sort? If relativities in preferences are to be acknowledged
seriously in economics, general equilibrium outcomes including endogenous sorting
must be understood.
In related empirical work, Barrington-Leigh and Helliwell [2007] combine high-
resolution geographic data from three Canada-wide socio-economic surveys and the
2001 census to disentangle the spatial pattern of reference groups and to identify chan-
nels of positive and negative spillovers on life satisfaction. For instance, it appears that
in Canadian urban regions the strongest reference group for the emulation of household
income spans the entire metropolitan region. One might summarise this crudely with
the finding that β > 0, β =−βR and βN = 0 in the following linear estimate:
U = β0+β I+βN I¯neighbourhood+βR I¯region+ ε (1)
1Quoted in Kingdon and Knight [2007].
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where I is own income and the other regressors are the mean incomes of one’s neigh-
bourhood and of one’s region. This finding implies that, ignoring any additional na-
tional and international comparison effects, there is no social benefit to increasing the
incomes of all households in a metropolitan region. On the other hand, there is a net
benefit within a neighbourhood to increasing all its residents’ incomes. With the aim to
put the empirical work on geographic consumption reference groups in a more explicit
framework, I develop a basic model of geographic organisation when such “Veblen”
preferences are relevant. This represents an extension of previous work in two regards.
In comparison to the symmetric Veblen equilibrium of Eaton and Eswaran [2006], I
treat cases when (1) consumption is not homogeneous across individuals and (2) con-
sumption reference groups are neither fixed nor common to all individuals. Thus, in-
terdependent preferences drive both the segregation of types into dissimilar reference
groups and the individual consumption choices given those reference groups. That is,
reference groups are endogenised.2 In the context pursued below, households choos-
ing a home take into account the neighbourhood, judged in part by the look of other
nearby houses. Simultaneously, within those neighbourhoods when building or main-
taining their houses, yards, and even amenities like cars, consumers are influenced by
the decisions of their neighbours and, in particular, tend to emulate local consumption
norms.
I will not abstract from details of the functional dependence of utility on consump-
tion of Veblen goods, since in investigating regional disparity one must depart from the
symmetric consumption equilibria which provide elegant solutions in the analysis of
Eaton and Eswaran [2006]. In addition, I depart from the representative agent formula-
tion and assume exogenous heterogeneity. However, non-symmetric equilibria do not
afford easy discussion of efficiency, since Veblen goods by their nature generate real
utility benefits for some individuals at the expense of others.
Geographic proximity is only one of several plausible factors in delineating ref-
erence groups. Other natural reference groups include nuclear and extended family,
work colleages, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic classes. Moreover, experience from
one’s own past and aspirations based on cognitive reasoning also provide reference
levels which frame consumption evaluation. These contextual effects are all consistent
with the evolutionary arguments of Rayo and Becker [2004]3. Nevertheless, a focus
on the interaction between interdependent preferences and settlement patterns that are
spatially sorted according to income or consumption level is particularly important for
its relevance to urban planning, real estate markets, and the empirical analysis of ge-
2The subjective well-being and social psychology literature indicates that there are likely systematic
biases (generally in the direction of materialism) in individual choice, such that contemporary individuals
are not acting to maximise their happiness [Dunn et al., 2003, Loewenstein et al., 2003]. However, there is
no clear indication that people are confused more specifically about the competitive nature of consumption.
In this work I do not assume any naivete´ on the part of decision makers. The outcomes are driven by the
collective action problem inherent in the consumption externality.
3They use a principal-agent framework to address the task of evolutionary forces in designing our internal
reward circuitry, subject to the constraints that it has finite bounds. They argue that it therefore must have
evolved with features that engineers would call automatic gain control and a (temporal) high-pass filter. That
is, the comparison level and scale used for translating one’s own consumption level into a psychological
reward adapt to make best use of the available range of the reward experience.
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ographic reference group effects4. The most obvious source of endogeneity for any
spatial analysis, such as the empirical work motivating this study, is that people are
mobile. Therefore, if reference effects are in play, households may have consciously
chosen their reference group by moving to it.
The paper treats two general model formulations. Section 2 addresses the first, in
which there are exactly two neighbourhood locations and two types of household. This
simple case foreshadows most of the main results, but suffers from analytic intractabil-
ity and assumes away the possibility of a (land) market being involved in the allocation
of groups, or locations, to households. In Section 3 both the neighbourhood character-
istics and the household types are continuously distributed and a land market regulates
who lives where. Counterintuitively, this framework turns out to be more amenable to
closed-form analysis than the discrete case. Section 4 provides some simulations of
sample equilibria, and Section 5 concludes. A number of issues are addressed in more
detail in the Appendix, which also contains proofs to propositions in the main text.
2 Discrete types and unpriced land
Consider a discrete set of household types, exogenously differentiated by their endow-
ment of labour productivity w ∈ [wL,wH ]. Each household chooses a consumption
level of a pure Veblen good and also chooses which peer group to join. The sole in-
dustry may be taken to be the production of the pure Veblen good, housing, and the
reference groups may be thought of as non-interacting neighbourhoods characterised
by the average value of housing chosen by their residents. After choosing a residential
neighbourhood, households compare their consumption of the Veblen good to aver-
age consumption in their own neighbourhood.5 Nevertheless, agents are sophisticated
rather than naı¨ve in that prior to choosing a location, they are fully aware that their
future consumption benefit will be framed by the neighbourhood that they have cho-
sen. I will henceforth use the housing and neighbourhood context to describe model
economies, although the relevance of the scenario extends to other Veblen goods with
endogenous reference groups.
To elucidate the possibility of self-forming groups amongst Veblen consumers who
make disaggregated decisons about their reference groups, I start by incorporating into
the utility function a benefit of living in a wealthy neighbourhood, to act in tandem
with the disutility imposed by having a higher consumption reference group.6 Let
preferences be defined7 over leisure x ≥ 0, the conspicuous extravagance h ≥ 0 of
4Several empricial studies have, for reasons of empirical convenience and availability of data, assessed
income reference groups on a geographic basis. See Barrington-Leigh and Helliwell [2007] and Clark et al.
[2008].
5The simplifying assumption that neighbourhoods are non-interacting in this interpretation makes the
model and those that follow non-spatial, strictly speaking. That is, there is no sense of physical proximity of
one neighbourhood to another.
6Without any benefits to having wealthy neighbours, there cannot be any differentiation of types. See
Appendix Section B.3 for a discussion of plausible positive consumption externalities in this geographic
context.
7This form of utility is convenient in that it admits an equilibrium of the desired kind. See Section C for
a discussion of the properties of the logarithm and exponential terms and how they relate to past literature
exploring utility functions defined over differences — which may be positive or negative — and ratios of
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one’s house, the average value h¯ of houses in one’s choice of a neighbourhood, and the
global average value of houses ¯¯h. For convenience, utility is additively separable into
a leisure term F(·), a Veblen term H(·) comparing own consumption with that of one’s
chosen peers, and a further Veblen term N(·) comparing one’s neighbourhood to other
neighbourhoods:8
U(x,h, h¯) =Φ log(x)−Λexp(−λ [h− h¯])+N log(1+ h¯/ ¯¯h) (2)
Under these preferences, neighbourhood benefits accrue relative to a reference level
¯¯h, which is the average consumption across neighbourhoods. The undesirable neigh-
bourhood externality, on the other hand, comes about through a more local comparison
between the neighbourhood standard h¯ and the household’s own consumption h. Using
this form for N(·) is convenient in part because it allows the consideration below of a
planner’s policy which eliminates all production of the Veblen good9 and also provides
consistency with Section 3, to follow.
In choosing its optimal consumption, a household of type w is constrained by the
budget
w[1− x]≥ h
Thus, given the optimality condition
x? = 1−h/w (3)
the household’s decision problem may be reduced to a nested choice of an optimal
housing purchase h
?
(h¯) for each possible neighbourhood h¯, followed by a choice of
optimal neighbourhood h¯
?
. In contrast to other superficially appealing forms for prefer-
ences, detailed in the Appendix, the utility function in equation (2) embodies bounded
benefits to individual consumption of the Veblen good and a large penalty in utility for
consuming much less than one’s neighbours. Holding h¯ fixed, U(x?(h),h) is concave
and its global optimum must be consistent with the first order condition
F ′(1− h
w
) = wHh(h, h¯) or h = 0 (4)
An explicit form for the optimal consumption choice h
?
(w, h¯) for a household placed in
a neighbourhood with average consumption h¯ can be written in terms of the principal
branch of the Lambert W function:10
quantities of goods.
8 Also discussed in the Appendix are models incorporating an absolute utility benefit of wealthy neigh-
bours, rather than the relative one posed here. This distinction is unlikely to be important except in as far as
it affects analytic tractability and ease of welfare analysis.
9For this case, the limit of 1+ h¯/ ¯¯h is taken to be 2.
10The Lambert W function, also occasionally called the omega function or product-log, is the inverse
function of f (Z) = Z exp(Z) [Corless et al., 1996]. Although less well known, it is very analogous to the
logarithm. The real-valued principal branch is always implied in this work. LambertW(x)> 0 for x > 0. It
is increasing, concave, and passes through the origin. Two identities used in this work are:
log(LambertW(Z)) = log(Z)−LambertW(Z)
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h
?
(w, h¯) = max
{
0, w− 1
λ
L(w, h¯)
}
(5)
where
L(w, h¯)≡ LambertW
(
Φ
Λ
eλ [w−h¯]
)
Consumption h
?
(w, h¯) is increasing (and leisure is decreasing) in h¯: households will
consume more when their neighbours do.11 The corner solution, h
?
= 0, occurs where
h¯ < 1λ log
( Φ
Λλw
)
. The indirect utility U(w, h¯) can then be expressed, as before, through
substitution of h
?
(w, h¯) into equation (2). Taking derivatives, this indirect utility is seen
to be concave in both the interior and corner regions:
d2U(w, h¯)
dh¯2
=

− λ 2Φ[L(w,h¯)+L(w,h¯)2] −
N
[h¯+ ¯¯h]2
< 0, for h¯ > 1λ log
( Φ
Λλw
)
−Λλ 2eλ h¯− N
[h¯+ ¯¯h]2
< 0, for h¯ < 1λ log
( Φ
Λλw
)
Because the first derivative dU(w,h¯)dh¯ is continuous through h¯ =
1
λ log
( Φ
Λλw
)
, concavity
ensures that there is a global maximum. Nevertheless, there is no general analytic form
for the optimal h¯, were a continuous choice available.
Moreover, households are not able to choose an arbitrary h¯. Rather, they must
choose between one of the two available neighbourhoods whose consumption levels h¯
are equilibrium outcomes. For a separating equilibrium12 in which h= h¯ for each type,
the equilibrium neighbourhoods lie at h¯eq = max
{
0, w− ΦΛλ
}
. Because for each type
w there exists a global optimum h¯ = h¯maxU , it may be possible for certain fortuitous
ranges of parameters to conspire to make h¯eq ≈ h¯maxU for each type. In this case,
both types are content in their own neighbourhood and allocations form a separating
equilibrium.
Figure 1a shows such a situation. By contrast, with different parameter values one
or the other of the household types may prefer a deviation from h¯eq, as shown in Fig-
ure 1b where the high type prefers to move.Marked in the left hand panels of Figure 1
are the utility levels for each household type in the alternate, pooling equilibrium, as
well as the homogeneous utility level for the case in which Veblen good production is
prohibited and leisure is maximised. The pooling outcome is always an equilibrium
and in cases such as that of Figure 1b it constitutes the unique equilibrium in pure
strategies.13
For the case shown in Figure 1a, the high type is better off in the separating equi-
librium, while the low type prefers the pooling equilibrium and could therefore be said
and
d
dZ
LambertW(Z) =
1
Z
LambertW(Z)
1+LambertW(Z)
11See Equation (42) on page 40 for a contrasting case.
12 A separating equilibrium is one in which neighbourhoods are differentiated according to household
type. This equilibrium is more explicitly defined in the Appendix on page 40. An analogous equilibrium for
the continuous case is also defined below in Section 3.
13See page 42 of the Appendix for a discussion of mixed strategies.
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(a) Separating quilibrium for Φ≈ 3, Λ≈ 1, λ ≈ 2, N ≈ 20, wL ≈ 2.7, and wH ≈ 4.5.
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(b) No separating equilibrim exists for Φ≈ 8, Λ≈ 1, λ ≈ 3, N ≈ 9, wL ≈ 3, and wH ≈ 7.
Figure 1: Contingent existence of separating equilibrium. Separating equilibrium
(a) exists for “log-exp-log” preferences given by equation (2) but none exists (b) for
other parameters in the same functional form. Also shown are utility levels in the
pooling equilibrium for each type (Upooling) and under the policy constraint of no
Veblen good production (Uplanner).
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to favour policy designed to encourage neighbourhood integration across economic
classes. Both types would prefer to have a planner remove the possibility of decen-
tralised decision making about Veblen good production altogether, since the negative
externality dominates the benefits even for the high type. This is reminiscent of the
findings of Eaton and Eswaran [2006].
These qualitative features are not universal, however. In Figure 2, panel (a) shows
a case when, conversely, the high type rather than the low type prefers an integrated
neighbourhood, while in panel (c) both types prefer the pooling equilibrium. Numerous
other orderings are possible. Figure 3 shows two cases in which the high type prefers
to keep Veblen goods in production; that is, the planner’s policy of eliminating Veblen
goods would not be a Pareto improvement over either unregulated equilibrium. In the
second case shown, the high type additionally prefers the integrated neighbourhood
with Veblen goods to the one without.
Still other welfare orderings were found for different parameter values. Figure 4
shows that different regimes of exogenous parameters result in different welfare impli-
cations. Outside the region shown, separating equilibria were not found to exist. The
distribution of points shows that endogenous group formation is not possible when
within-group comparisons (Λ) receive considerably stronger weight in preferences
than the between-group comparisons (N).
2.1 Summary
So far I have analysed the simplest case of a heterogeneous population choosing their
own reference groups — the case of two types. Depending on the functional form of
the utility, households may prefer to have higher or lower consumption of a Veblen
good when they move to a higher consumption neighbourhood.14 In all cases, there
exists a pooling equilibrium conforming to the consistency condition that all house-
holds choose each neighbourhood with equal probability. Only for certain cases, on
the other hand, does a pure strategy equilibrium exist in which different types prefer
to remain segregated in neighbourhoods of internally homogeneous consumption lev-
els. Nevertheless, the discrete nature of the choice amongst neighbourhoods makes it
difficult to find closed form solutions or conditions on the existence of such equilibria.
When both pooling and separating equilibria exist, numerical simulation indicates
no simple universal welfare implications. Pure Veblen goods may be a desirable feature
of the economy for wealthier households, and the freedom to relocate to form one’s
own reference groups may be desirable for one, both, or neither of the two types. These
general features will be recaptured in the more analytical analysis to follow.
One reason for the awkwardness of the household problem and the condition for
existence of a separating equilibrium is that there is no price to capture the benefit
of a neighbourhood’s consumption externalities. A natural way to do this is to allow
a price for land, which heretofore has been costless. That is, for the case of a dis-
crete set of neighbourhoods, separating equilibrian could more easily be supported if
entry to a neighbourhood was competitive and exacted a cost to the household. How-
ever, two potential problems present themselves in this regard. First, prices relate to
14For the latter case, see, for example, Equation (42) on page 40.
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Figure 2: Additional cases of equilibrium under “log-exp-log” preferences.
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Figure 3: Further cases of equilibrium under “log-exp-log” preferences.
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marginal benefits in the real world and are therefore best incorporated into a model with
a continuum of neighbourhood consumption levels h¯. Secondly, in order to preserve a
general equilibrium analysis, revenue from the sale or rental of land must be returned
somehow to households.
These two issues are addressed in the following section by extending the endoge-
nous reference group choice set to a continuum and by more realistically pricing land
independently from housing.
3 A Continuum of types and a market for land
Consider then a framework in which, once again, static consumption reference-setting
occurs both within a neighbourhood and between neighbourhoods. In choosing how
much to spend on their own dwelling, household make a decision which is framed by
the norm in their neighbourhood. In addition, households must choose a neighbour-
hood in which to position themselves. This affects not only the utility derived from
their individual consumption choice but also provides a status payoff since they derive
satisfaction from the relative standing of their neighbourhood.15
Therefore, as before, decisionmakers are faced with competing incentives to place
themselves in a high or low affluence neighbourhood. In the analysis to follow, how-
ever, I introduce an additional direct cost associated with this choice. This comes about
by relaxing the assumption of free land. When land is owned and rented, the marginal
value to the renter of the reference level embodied by a particular location is captured
in the price of land. This market can, as I show below, facilitate a disaggregated choice
equilibrium of the kind already treated for discrete types.
In contrast to models such as that of Rothstein [2006] in which a small number of
school districts confer peer effects to their residents,16 a reasonable number of con-
sumption reference group choices in the present context is large, since prospective
homeowners can typically choose their neighbourhood from a nearly continuous set
of affluence levels. Accordingly, I consider the case when there is a continuum of
neighbourhoods rather than a discrete set. A crucial feature of the equilibrium to be
defined below is that households have the option of moving to a neighbourhood with
a marginally greater or lesser average consumption, just as they have the option of
marginal changes to the size of their own house. Because households can relocate
to their ideal reference group, there is no clustering of different types together in one
neighbourhood.
15 As mentioned previously, there are several possible reasons for neighbourhood status. For the sake of
concreteness, I keep as the driver the same conspicuous consumption that drives house choice itself. That
is, a neighbourhood’s status value is determined by its average level of housing as compared with that of
the greater region. This corresponds to the type 3 benefit on page 37. This specification is consistent with
the findings of Barrington-Leigh and Helliwell [2007] and provides a coherent interpretation for welfare
analysis of the consumption of neighbourhood quality. The drawback of this format is some superficial
complexity: the household problem now represents two nested Veblen consumption choices. However, only
one incorporates an endogenous choice of reference group, and it is the dynamics of this endogeneity that is
the focus of the investigation.
16A different Tiebout equilibrium is defined in that case for each exogenously given integer number of
discrete districts. In contrast, I consider continua of both household types and neighbourhoods and solve,
below, for a unique equilibrium.
13
3.1 Agents’ problem
As before, household agents are exogenously differentiated by their endowed labour
productivity w ∈ [wL,wH ] in housebuilding, the sole industry. Now, however, types
are continuously and uniformly distributed over this range. For each type w, there is a
population of measure 1.
Agents maximise the following additively separable utility function through their
choice of leisure 0 ≤ x ≤ 1; the extravagance h ≥ 0 of their house, which is the nu-
meraire good; and their choice of a neighbourhood characterised by houses of average
value h¯:
U(x,h, h¯) = F(x)+H(h, h¯)+N(h¯, ¯¯h)
The regional average level of housing consumption ¯¯h is perceived as identical by
everyone. Each household is constrained by the budget
w[1− x]+ r ≥ h+ p(h¯)
where r is any land dividend income received, and p(h¯) is the competitive price of land
in a neighbourhood with mean consumption h¯. I will assume that land plots come in
parcels that are independent of the size of the house that is built on them, and that this
parcel size is uniform across neighbourhoods.
3.2 Firms’ problem
Formally, there are two sectors of competitive firms.
Land management sector
Although the neighbourhood economy considered here is not explicitly spatial in that it
abstracts from the arrangement and proximity of different neighbourhoods with respect
to each other, the supply side of the land market must nevertheless be modeled in order
for land price to be endogenous. Three scenerios present themselves as reasonable
model assumptions:
free land: First of all, a simpler case is the one in which land is part of a commons.
Then r = p(h¯) = 0 and households choose their neighbourhood without any ex-
plicit cost, as in the discrete model of Section 2. Neighbourhoods are neverthe-
less mutually segregated.
absentee landowners: In this case, all plots of land are owned by absentee landlords
who have no current use for them, and they rent individual plots to the highest
bidder. Dividends r are zero for all households. For the purpose of welfare
analysis, landowners are considered to be external to the economy.
uniform ownership: This case is similar to that of absentee landowners except that
each plot of land is rented by an independent firm whose shares are equally
14
owned by all households.17 All rental income is profit and is distributed uni-
formly to shareholders. Thus each household, regardless of type, receives divi-
dends r corresponding to the average price of rented land.
For reasons discussed below, land is assumed in much of what follows to be owned
and rented by firms. Each plot of land is owned and managed by a separate price-taking
firm whose equity is in turn owned in equal part by all households. Firms have no costs
and simply receive rent p from the highest bidder for their land, subject only to the
condition of nonnegative profit:
p≥ 0 (6)
Firms then distribute all their profit to their shareholders.
Housebuilding sector
There is also a competitive housing production industry. Agents are endowed with an
innate and universally visible productivity. Firms hire workers, pay them according to
their productivity, and produce houses (or house maintenance, or conspicuous hosehold
consumption goods more generally), making zero profit.
3.3 Definition of equilibrium
Given a continuous range of types [wL,wH ], a separating neighbourhood equilibrium
consists of an average consumption h¯(n) for each neighbourhood n,18 an overall re-
gional average consumption ¯¯h, market land prices p(h¯) in each neighbourhood, rental
dividends r, and allocations
{
x(w), h(w), h¯(w)
}
, which
• satisfy consistency and aggregation requirements, in order that the perceived
mean h¯ is equal to the average consumption in each neighbourhood and that
the global mean ¯¯h is the average over neighbourhoods,
h¯ =
∫
{w|h¯(w)=h¯} h(w)dw ∀h¯ (7)
¯¯h =
∫
h¯(w)dw (8)
• satisfy a non-profit condition on rental income (for the case when dividends are
returned to households),
r =
∫
p
(
h¯(w)
)
dw,
• satisfy the firms’ incentive criterion,
p(h¯)≥ 0 (9)
17Unequal land ownership may be empirically more appealing and may represent a more acceptable mid-
dle ground between the two extremes, but it would constitute a complication at the moment.
18I will often refer to neighbourhoods, formally indexed by the continuous parameter n, by their equilib-
rium property, h¯.
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• satisfy each utility-maximising household who takes the allocations of others as
given;
• and for which households are at least partly differentiated by type into different
neighbourhood reference groups.
In addition, in order to eliminate degenerate solutions, I constrain the equilibrium to
exclude allocations in which a disjoint set of types occupies a neighbourhood. For in-
stance, this allows occupancy by the range [w1, w2] but not by the discrete set{w1, w2}
for w1 6= w2.
I restrict utility U(·) to be smoothly varying. For such functions, no continuous
range of w will find the same (i.e., not varying with w) value of h¯ to be optimal for
interior allocations. Therefore, the above constraint against disjoint sets implies that
equation (7) may be simplified to state that neighbourhoods are internally homoge-
neous:
h(w) = h¯(w) for each w (7’)
The case when all occupied neighbourhoods exhibit identical average conspicuous
consumption h¯ is a pooling neighbourhood equilibrium.
3.4 Land markets are required for separating equilibria
Not all of the land ownership scenarios listed above admit separating equilibria. I first
dispense with the free land possibility for a large set of functional forms and later, in
Section 3.12, show that the absentee landlord case is also incompatible with separating
equilibrium. As an additional refinement to Definition 3.3, let an assortative separat-
ing neighbourhood equilibrium be one in which the allocation of household types to
neighbourhood types is one to one.
Proposition 3.1. (Requirement for land market) If land is unpriced, there is no assor-
tative separating equilibrium of continuous types. If land is unpriced, N(·) is concave
or convex and H(h, h¯) is a function of either h− h¯ or h/h¯, there is no pure strategy
separating equilibrium of continuous types.
Proof. Consider the choice of neighbourhood h¯ by agents of type w when a continuum
of neighbourhood types exist. The first order condition for the choice of h¯, when an
optimum exists, is
0 =
∂U(x,h, h¯, ¯¯h)
∂ h¯
= F1(x)
∂x
∂ h¯
+H2(h, h¯)+N1(h¯, ¯¯h) (10)
When p(h¯) = 0, that is when the choice of neighbourhood has no direct bearing on
a household’s budget, ∂x/∂ h¯= 0. Therefore, when (10) is evaluated at the equilibrium
condition h = h¯, it becomes
H2(h¯, h¯)+N1(h¯, ¯¯h) = 0 (11)
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which implicitly specifies the same choice(s) of h¯ for all agents regardless of type, w.
Therefore there is no unique sorting of types into neighbourhoods based on w — that
is, no assortative separating neighbourhood equilibrium.
Furthermore, if H(·) takes the special forms f (h− h¯) or f ( hh¯), then H2(h¯, h¯) has
value − f ′(0) or − 1h¯ f ′(1), respectively. In either case ∂H2(h¯, h¯)/∂ h¯ = 0 and since
N11 6= 0, the left hand side of Equation equation (11) is monotonic and thus there is at
most a unique solution for h¯ and therefore no separating equilibrium.
This result may seem unintuitive in the context of the literature on discrete Tiebout
equilibria, and it is difficult to find a good conceptual description to complement the
proof. The impossibility of a separating equilibrium comes about because agents have
two continuous choices to make but equilibrium requires that they align along a single
dimension: the assortment of types into neighbourhoods. Without another price to
clear the market in neighbourhood choice, the two sets of first order conditions cannot
be simultaneously satisfied while meeting the equilibrium condition that h = h¯.
3.5 Some general properties of equilibrium with a land market
Let h
? (
h¯
)
be the consumption level chosen optimally in a given neighbourhood with
average consumption h¯, and consider a utility function for which the indirect utility
U(w, h¯) =U
(
w,h
? (
h¯
)
, h¯
)
(12)
is globally concave and in which x is essential, i.e., F(x)→−∞ as x→ 0. Then the nec-
essary optimality conditions for each household’s choice of housing h ≥ 0 and leisure
0≤ x≤ 1 take the following form:
F ′(x)−wHh(h, h¯)−wξ = 0 and (13)
ξ
[
r−h− p(h¯)]= 0 (14)
where ξ is a Lagrange multiplier for the x ≤ 1 constraint, which is equivalent to h+
p(h¯)≥ r. Since r and p(h¯) are each nonnegative, this condition is stronger than h≥ 0,
which therefore becomes redundant. For the choice of neighbourhood consumption
h¯≥ 0, necessary optimality conditions are:
[
F ′(x)−wξ ] p′(h¯)+wHh¯(h, h¯)−wNh¯(h¯, ¯¯h)≥ 0 and (15)[[
F ′(x)−wξ ] p′(h¯)+wHh¯(h, h¯)−wNh¯(h¯, ¯¯h)] h¯ = 0 (16)
Considering interior values of h and h¯, equation (13) can be used to eliminate F ′(x)
in equation (16), providing a differential equation in p′(h¯), h, h¯, and ¯¯h. Evaluating this
at the equilibrium housing choice h = h¯ gives:
p′(h¯) =
H2(h¯, h¯)+N1(h¯, ¯¯h)
H1(h¯, h¯)
(17)
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Given a value for p(0), equation equation (17) can be integrated to find the price of
land for any neighbourhood. This property is used in the sections to follow.
3.6 Log-exp-log utility with equitable ownership
In order to find an explicit equilibrium solution for continuous types, I apply the equal
ownership land model to the same functional form of utility used for discretely dis-
tributed types in Section 2:
U(x,h, h¯) =Φ log(x)−Λexp(−λ [h− h¯])+N log(1+ h¯¯¯h
)
(18)
For this specification, the house choice first order conditions (13) and (14), evalu-
ated under the equilibrium condition h = h¯, determine household leisure:
x(w) = min
{
Φ
wΛλ
, 1
}
= min
{w0
w
, 1
}
(19)
where
w0 ≡ ΦΛλ (20)
Households with productivity below w0 choose not to expend any effort on building
status symbols or buying into high-status neighbourhoods. Instead, they enjoy leisure
x = 1 and pool together in a low-status neighbourhood where spending is funded en-
tirely by the universal dividend income, r. Because neighbourhoods in equilibrium are
characterised by homogeneous consumption, the marginal value of housing consump-
tion is uniformly equal to
∂H(h, h¯)
∂h
∣∣∣∣
h=h¯
= Λλ
As a result, the minimum wealth level for entry into the workforce is independent of
the distribution of others’ types. Moreover, it does not depend on the household’s
preference N(·) for neighbourhood status19 but solely on the relative importance of
leisure versus “keeping up with the Jones” in one’s own neighbourhood.
Using 19 with the condition that no income is wasted generates an equation gov-
erning the neighbourhood allocations necessary for equilibrium:
h¯(w)+ p
(
h¯
)
= r+max{0, w−w0} (21)
Denote by h¯min the solution to h¯+ p(h¯) = r; this neighbourhood is the lowest possible
occupied neighbourhood.
19Nor would it depend on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of leisure, which in the current for-
mulation is fixed to 1.
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The differential equation for price, equation (17), becomes20
p′(h¯) =−1+ N[
h¯+ ¯¯h
]
Λλ
(22)
First, note that the sign of p(·) is indeterminate. In fact, while p′(0) is positive
if N > Λλ ¯¯h, it is negative otherwise; p has a maximum at h¯ = NΛλ − ¯¯h. If N < Λλ ¯¯h,
therefore, price is decreasing in neighbourhood affluence for all occupied neighbour-
hoods. This situation corresponds to preferences in which the neighbourhood status
term N is relatively weak compared with consumption comparisons against immediate
neighbours, and the average productivity is high.21
Land management firms would be willing to lend land for free but, in accordance
with equation (9), are never willing to pay households to occupy land. Therefore, in
equilibrium any continuous range of occupied neighbourhoods must bear a positive
land price in order to meet condition equation (22).22 It can be seen that for large h¯,
p′(h¯)→−1 and therefore p eventually crosses zero. Indeed, for h¯ above some h¯max,
land price would need to be negative for neighbourhoods to be attractive to any house-
hold. The diminishing marginal returns to increasing status through neighbourhood
choice are offset by the non-diminishing marginal cost to “keep up with the Jones”
within a chosen neighbourhood.
In order to integrate equation (22) to find the price of land in any neighbourhood,
a boundary condition on p(h¯) is required. For the moment, let the integration constant
remain unknown as p0. Then equation (22) becomes
p(h¯) = max
{
0, p0− h¯+ NΛλ log
(
1+
h¯
¯¯h
)}
(23)
The price can now be eliminated from earlier expressions to find neighbourhood
allocations as a function of r and ¯¯h. Assuming that p(h¯(w))> 0 ∀w, 21 and 23 can be
combined to find
h¯ = r− p(h¯)+max{0, w−w0}
= r− p0+ h¯− NΛλ log
(
1+
h¯
¯¯h
)
+max{0, w−w0}
→ log
(
1+
h¯
¯¯h
)
=
Λλ
N
[r− p0+max{0, w−w0}]
→ h¯(w,r− p0, ¯¯h) = ¯¯hexp
(
Λλ
r− p0+max{0, w−w0}
N
)
− ¯¯h (24)
20A closed form of the indirect utility U(h¯) based on results to follow shows that the second order condition
for the choice of neighbourhood is satisfied for all values of p:
∂2U
(
h
?
(h¯),h¯
)
∂ h¯2 < 0 for all parameter values.
See Section 3.8.
21The endogenous value ¯¯h is expressed in terms of exogenous parameters below.
22This logic is the same reason that land pricing is necessary at all. See Proposition 3.1 on page 16.
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This states that in equilibrium household consumption choice of the Veblen good in-
creases convexly with productivity. Solving for h¯min gives
h¯min = ¯¯h
[
eΛλ
r−p0
N −1
]
Let h¯max denote the upper root of p(h¯) = 0 in equation (23). Below neighbourhood
consumption level h¯min, households cannot balance their budget in equilibrium without
throwing income away. Above neighbourhood consumption level h¯max, households
would need to be compensated for occupying the land.23
If this upper limit on neighbourhood affluence is binding — that is, when h¯(wH ,r, ¯¯h)>
h¯max — a separating equilibrium cannot exist. However, the next section shows that
one can always find some price schedule which avoids this constraint.
3.7 General equilibrium averages
Denoting by 〈·〉 an average over all types, the global average conspicuous consumption
level is easily calculated from equation (21) as the total labour output in the production
of housing:
¯¯h = 〈h¯〉= 〈r− p(h¯(w))+max{0, w−w0}〉
= 〈max{w0, w}−w0〉
=
{wH+wL
2 −w0 if wL > w0
[wH−w0]2
2[wH−wL] if wL ≤ w0 ≤ wH
(25)
where I have used the fact that under uniform land ownership, 〈r〉= 〈p(h¯(w))〉.
Recalling that w0 = ΦΛλ , equation equation (25) states that when all households
make interior choices, the average consumption of the Veblen good increases with the
population average productivity in producing it, increases with the strength of the equi-
librium local Veblen effect Λλ due to comparison with one’s immediate neighbours,
and decreases with the strength of preferences for leisure.
Defining wm ≡ max{wL,w0} to be the lowest household type which chooses to
work, a constraint on r follows from carrying out the integral over p(w) explicitly.
23 Equation equation (24) shows that, while pooling behaviour amongst the least endowed types is possible
at h¯ = h¯min, pooling of multiple types is not possible in any neighbourhood with a higher level of affluence.
The implication of a downward-sloped price curve and a non-negative land price is that the market may
unravel if a sufficiently wealthy type of household exists. For w high enough, the effective marginal cost of
neighbourhood membership outweighs the status benefit, and demand for land at non-negative prices is zero
in all more affluent neighbourhoods. In order to be induced to settle there, affluent types would need to be
subsidised to compensate them for their contribution to the neighbourhood’s status. However, once again
the land holding firms are unwilling to subsidise (equation equation (23)). Households with w greater than
some wmax will prefer a neighbourhood h¯ in equation (24) which will exceed h¯max. Above h¯ = h¯max, the
land price p(h¯) sticks at 0 and there is no way to satisfy wealthy households with pure strategies. The most
wealthy with w > wmax would, in the absence of any available neighbourhoods h¯(w), prefer to settle in a
community with h¯max, but doing so would raise the average consumption level there, making it unattractive
for its original occupants if the rent remains at p = 0. Thus those original residents would prefer to move
“down” to a less affluent neighbourhood, and so on; the separated neighbourhoods unravel.
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Using equation (24),
〈h¯〉 = ¯¯h
〈
exp
(
Λλ
r− p0+max{0, w−w0}
N
)
−1
〉
1+
〈h¯〉
¯¯h
=
1
wH −wL e
Λλ
N [r−p0]
∫ wH
wL
e
Λλ
N max{0, w−w0}dw
Λλ
N
[r− p0] = log
[1+ 〈h¯〉¯¯h
]
wH −wL∫ wH
wL e
Λλ
N max{0, w−w0}dw

Therefore,
r− p0 = 1Λλ
N
log

[
1+ 〈h¯〉/ ¯¯h
]
[wH −wL]∫ wm
wL 1dw+
∫ wH
wm e
Λλ
N [w−w0]dw

=
1
Λλ
N
log

[
1+ 〈h¯〉/ ¯¯h
]
[wH −wL]
wm−wL+ 1Λλ
N
e−
Λλ
N w0
[
e
Λλ
N wH − eΛλN wm
]

=
1
Λλ
N
log

[
1+ 〈h¯〉/ ¯¯h
]
[wH −wL]
wm−wL+ 1Λλ
N
e
Λλ
N [wm−w0]
[
e
Λλ
N [wH−wm]−1
]
 (26)
In equilibrium, 〈h¯〉/ ¯¯h = 1. If wL > w0 (that is, for wm = wL), the above condition takes
the form:
r− p0 = 1Λλ
N
log
 2ΛλN [wH −wL]
e
Λλ
N [wL−w0]
[
e
Λλ
N [wH−wL]−1
]

= w0−wL+ 1Λλ
N
log
 2ΛλN [wH −wL][
e
Λλ
N [wH−wL]−1
]
 (27)
According to equation (26) and equation (27), r has a fixed relationship to p0 based
on exogenous parameters. Because h¯(·) in 24 depends only on the difference r− p0,
expressed above, any choice of base price p0 results in the same consumption alloca-
tions amongst separating equilibria. On the other hand, according to equation (23) the
value of h¯max, where p(h¯) = 0, is monotonically increasing in p0. Therefore an equi-
librium price schedule which accomodates the highest household type always exists.
That is, for some p0 high enough, p(h¯(wH)) > 0 and thus wmax > wH . A higher p0
simply means higher dividends for all households and a higher base price for land. The
insensitivity of equilibrium allocations and utility to the choice of p0 simplifies welfare
analysis somewhat but does not offset the redistributive effect of common land owner-
ship as compared with an absentee land owner model. The slope of the price curve is
unaffected by p0 but is central to the equilibrium distribution of outcomes through the
opposing effects of making high-income neighbourhoods exclusive and through more
strongly redistributing wealth.
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3.8 Concavity
As discussed in Section D.1 of the Appendix for the case of discrete types, it remains to
ensure that the household’s problem is characterised by a global maximum. A second
order sufficiency condition is that the price schedule presents a concave objective func-
tion for the indirect utility U(w, h¯) =U(w,h
?
(h¯), h¯). Given a neighbourhood choice h¯,
the optimal household consumption level is
h
?
(h¯) = max
{
r− p(h¯), [w+ r− p(h¯)]− 1
λ
L (w, h¯)
}
(28)
where
L (w, h¯)≡ LambertW
(
Φ
Λ
eλ [w+r−p(h¯)−h¯]
)
Therefore the indirect utility is
U(w, h¯) = Φ log
(
min
{w0
w
, 1
})
(29)
−Λexp
(
−λ
[
max
{
r− p(h¯), [w+ r− p(h¯)]− 1
λ
L (w, h¯)
}
− h¯
])
+N log
(
1+
h¯
¯¯h
)
Consider the case of interior equilibria. Then r− p(h¯) in the above expression can
be eliminated in favour of the constant [r− p0] using equation (23):
r− p(h¯) = r− p0− [p− p0]
= [r− p0]+ h¯− NΛλ log
(
1+
h¯
¯¯h
)
to find
U(w, h¯) =Φ log
(w0
w
)
+N log
(
1+
h¯
¯¯h
)
−Λexp
(
−λ
[
w+[r− p0]− NΛλ log
(
1+
h¯
¯¯h
)
− 1
λ
LambertW
(
Φ
Λ
eλ
[
w+[r−p0]− NΛλ log
(
1+ h¯¯¯h
)])])
=Φ log
(w0
w
)
+N log
(
1+
h¯
¯¯h
)
−Λ
[
1+
h¯
¯¯h
]−NΛ
e−λ [w+[r−p0]]
× exp
(
LambertW
(
Φ
Λ
[
1+
h¯
¯¯h
]−NΛ
eλ [w+[r−p0]]
))
which can be shown to have everywhere a negative second partial derivative with
respect to h¯.
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3.9 Existence
The proof of the following existence claim is given in Section F on page 50 of the
Appendix and follows by construction from the preceding discussion.
Proposition 3.2. (Existence of separating equilibrium) For preferences of the “LEL”
form and with a continuum of types and neighbourhood locations, there is a unique
allocation of consumption x(w), h(w), and h¯(w) conforming to the equilibrium of Def-
inition 3.3.
3.10 Welfare analysis of interior equilibria
The equilibrium utility can now be written in terms of exogenous parameters,
U(w) = Φ log
(
min
{w0
w
,1
})
−Λ+Λλ max{0,w−w0}
+N log
 2[wH −wL]
wm−wL+ 1Λλ
N
e
Λλ
N [wm−w0]
[
e
Λλ
N [wH−wm]−1
]

Note that the last term depends on the distribution of types but not on individual
w. Also, the equilibrium welfare does not depend on the choice of base price p0 in
the land market. Using the notation Θ≡ wH/wL, the utility for the interior case, when
wL > w0, takes the form
U(w) =Φ log
(
Φ
Λλw
)
−Λ+Λλ [w−wL]+N log
(
2ΛλN [Θ−1]wL
e
Λλ
N [Θ−1]wL −1
)
For simplicity, the analysis to follow focuses on interior equilbria. Properties of this
equlibrium can now be summarised as follows.
Intra-neighbourhood comparisons Welfare disparity is intensified not by the strength
N of preferences over inter-neighbourhood comparisons, but by the strength of the lo-
cal, intra-neighbourhood Veblen effect, Λλ :
dU
dw
= Λλ − Φ
w
> 0
The negative term reflects the fact that to the extent that non-pecuniary pursuits are
important to household utility, i.e. that Φ is large, endowment differences will not be
reflected in welfare disparities.
Improvements to productivity As noted by Eaton and Eswaran [2006], improve-
ments to productivity in the Veblen good industry can be harmful to welfare. Consider
a multiplicative shift in the entire range of household productivities. This corresponds
to raising or lowering wL while holding Θ constant.
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To assess the implication of an increase in productivity within a heterogeneous pop-
ulation, two marginal effects must be considered. A given household will experience
individual productivity enhancement dw = wwL dwL. The household’s change in utility
will be the sum of a component due to this individual shift within the distribution U(w)
and one due to the changing distribution. The latter effect is
∂U
∂wL
∣∣∣∣
Θ
= −Λλ + N
wL
−Λλ [Θ−1]e
Λλ
N [Θ−1]wL
e
Λλ
N [Θ−1]wL −1
(30)
= −Λλ + N
wL
−Λλ Θ−1
1− e−ΛλN [Θ−1]wL
(31)
which fits a form of the function Ψ(·) defined and characterised in Lemma E.3 on
page 48 on page 48:
∂U
∂wL
∣∣∣∣
Θ
=−Λλ +Ψ
(
−Λλ [Θ−1], wL
N
)
< 0
The inequality follows from the property that Ψ(−a,b) < 0 for positive a and b. The
overall marginal effect on a given household of rescaling productivity is the sum of the
individual and distributional effects:
dU =
∂U
∂w
dw+
∂U
∂wL
∣∣∣∣
Θ
dwL
=
∂U
∂w
w
wL
dwL+
∂U
∂wL
∣∣∣∣
Θ
dwL
=
[
Λλ − Φ
w
]
w
wL
dwL+
[
−Λλ +Ψ
(
−Λλ [Θ−1], wL
N
)]
dwL
=
[
Λλ
[
w
wL
−1
]
− Φ
wL
+Ψ
(
−Λλ [Θ−1], wL
N
)]
dwL (32)
Numerical simulations of this function are explored below. The second and third terms
are strictly negative for positive dwL, and for large Φ in this pure Veblen labour econ-
omy every individual is worse off when productivities of each participant household
are uniformly scaled up.
In general, growth in this context has negative welfare implications for the least
wealthy, and may have positive benefits for the wealthiest.
The homogeneous population case from Eaton and Eswaran [2006] can be recov-
ered by noting from Lemma E.3 on page 48 that
lim
Θ→1
dU
dwL
∣∣∣∣
Θ
=−Φ
w
That is, for homogeneous populations with sufficient productivity to merit produc-
tion in the Veblen good industry, any increase in productivity is uniformly bad for
welfare.
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Helping the poor Indeed, even raising the productivity of only the poorest is bad
for everyone else’s welfare, a counterintuitive result when thinking is conditioned by
non-Veblen goods models:24
∂U
∂wL
∣∣∣∣
wH
= −Λλ − N
wH −wL +
Λλ
e
Λλ
N [wH−wL]−1
= −Λλ −Ψ
(
wH −wL
N
, Λλ
)
< 0
Wealthy and Veblen good productivity Increasing productivity in this model is,
however, not bad policy in all cases. Adding wealthy households to the economy is
beneficial for everyone due to the redistributive effects outweighing the comparison
externality:
∂U
∂Θ
∣∣∣∣
wL
= wL
∂U
∂wH
∣∣∣∣
wL
=
N
Θ−1 −
ΛλwL
e
Λλ
N [Θ−1]wL −1
(33)
= Ψ
(
ΛλwL,
Θ−1
N
)
> 0
Disparity In order to investigate the effect of disparity, consider next a mean-preserving
spread in the distribution of w. Rewriting wL = 〈w〉− 12∆ and wH = 〈w〉+ 12∆, the effect
of a change in the range ∆ is:
∂U
∂∆
∣∣∣∣〈w〉 = ∂∂∆
∣∣∣∣〈w〉
(
Φ log
(
Φ
Λλw
)
−Λ+Λλ
[
w−〈w〉+ ∆
2
]
+N log
(
2ΛλN ∆
e
Λλ
N ∆−1
))
=
1
2
Λλ +
N
∆
− Λλ
1− e−ΛλN ∆
=
1
2
Λλ +Ψ
(
−Λλ , ∆
N
)
< 0
Increasing exogenous disparity at a constant mean productivity does not affect average
consumption
(
d ¯¯h
d∆ = 0
)
nor the price schedule
(
d p(h¯)
d∆ = 0
)
but is uniformly bad for
welfare for all extant households. This comes about because when the spread ∆ of
household productivities increases, the average cost of housing of the new high types
and new low types, combined, is less than the old average. In other words, the dividends
r decrease:
∂ r
∂∆
∣∣∣∣〈w〉 = ∂∂∆
∣∣∣∣〈w〉
−〈w〉− ∆
2
+
Φ
Λλ
+
N
Λλ
log
 2Λλ∆
N
[
1− e−ΛλN ∆
]

24This experiment consists of removing the least productive households from the economy. Therefore, the
welfare of the removed households is not included. However, when the loss of dividends r by the removed
households outweighs the extra income from their improved w, they too will prefer to remain within the
economy. Thus, removing them represents a Pareto decline.
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2
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(
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Λλ
N
∆
)
< 0
The inequality follows, once again, from Lemma E.3 which shows that
lim
b→0
Ψ(1,b) =
1
2
and that ddbΨ(1,b)< 0.
3.11 Empirical interpretation
A central feature of the empirical results of Barrington-Leigh and Helliwell [2007] is
that the well-being effect of a marginal change in the affluence of one’s immediate
neighbours is much smaller than the effect of a marginal change in broader consump-
tion averages, which are strongly negative. Accordingly, the separating equilibrium
modeled here has the feature that, after households have chosen their neighbourhood
reference group, dU/dh¯ = 0 but dU/d ¯¯h is significantly negative.
3.12 Log-exp-log utility with absentee landlords
In the previous section, feedback from the aggregate effects of the distribution over
types onto the household decision problem comes through both r and ¯¯h. When land
rents are high, the equitable land ownership model significantly redistributes income
by returning land rents uniformly to all households, thus narrowing the relative disper-
sion in wealth and consumption. Because the distribution of consumption is central to
household choices and to welfare analysis, the details of how land equity is distributed
matters in interpreting equilibrium outcomes.
An alternative extreme is for none of the land rents to be returned to households in
the economy; this is the case of absentee landowners. Welfare analysis is also compli-
cated, however, when rents are paid to absentee landowners unless the welfare of those
landowners is somehow included in the accounting.
When r = 0, households who choose not to work have no outside income with
which to pay for land or housing. These households with w < w0 prefer to pool to-
gether in a “slum” enjoying leisure x = 1, no conspicuous housing consumption, and
a reference neighbourhood with zero consumption. That is, h¯min becomes 0 and the
price of land there, p0, must also be zero. Thus, with r− p0 = 0, equation 26 becomes
a knife-edge constraint on parameters. Except for certain peculiar parameter sets, there
are no separating equilibria when land is owned by absentees and rents leave the econ-
omy.
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3.13 Pooling equilibria
When all neighbourhoods have an equivalent mix of types, h¯ = ¯¯h for all households.
Household choice of consumption h and leisure x = 1−h/w maximises
U(x,h, h¯) =Φ log(x)−Λexp(−λ [h− h¯])+N log(2) (34)
h(w) =
{
0, for w≤ w0e−λ h¯
w− 1λ LambertW
(
Φeλw−λ h¯
Λ
)
, otherwise
The average consumption ¯¯h = h¯ can be expressed recursively by computing the
average value of h(w):
h¯ =
〈
max
{
0, w− 1
λ
LambertW
(
Φeλw−λ h¯
Λ
)}〉
=
w2H −w2m
2 [wH −wL] −
LambertW
(
Φeλ wH−λ h¯
Λ
)2
−LambertW
(
Φeλ wm−λ h¯
Λ
)2
2λ 2 [wH −wL]
−
LambertW
(
Φeλ wH−λ h¯
Λ
)
−LambertW
(
Φeλ wm−λ h¯
Λ
)
λ 2 [wH −wL] (35)
where wm = wm(h¯) ≡ max
{
wL, w0e−λ h¯
}
. Equation 35 may be solved numerically
for h¯, from which values for h¯(w) and U(w) follow. In this equilibrium, each house-
hold randomises its choice of neighbourhood since all neighbourhoods are alike and
present the same environment h¯ = ¯¯h. No deviation to another neighbourhood is benefi-
cial and households choose only their individual consumption, h, given the global mean
consumption level. This global consumption level is determined by the collective ex-
ternal effects of each household’s choice of h. Properties of such pooling equilibria are
demonstrated numerically, below.
3.14 Planner’s problem
In an economy with a pure Veblen good such as the one modeled here, a reasonable
policy for a planner is to prevent, for instance through prohibitive taxation,25 any pro-
duction of the Veblen good at all. Under this constraint, all households enjoy leisure
x = 1 and inhabit identical neighbourhoods with h¯ = 0. The utility in this case is uni-
formly
U =−Λ+N log(2)
25Here a relevant distinction is between a status good valued through a comparison of actual consumption
and one which is valued by its cost to the buyer. The former is treated in this paper, while the latter is
sometimes referred to as a “snob” good. In the snob good case, taxing the good may not affect net houshold
expenditure on it, but it will still decrease its production and redistribute the revenue.
27
10 20 30
0
w
r=9. 4
h=20. 1
hhpp(w)
0.1
0.2
0.3Lei sure
10 20 30
2
3
4
5
6
7
w
Upooli ng
Usep
Uplanner
15 20 25 30
5
10
15
h
Pri ce
Figure 5: An equilibrium with monotonically increasing price amongst occupied
neighbourhoods. Parameters: w ∈ (6.9,37.9),Φ= 0.3,Λ= 0.2,λ = 0.6,N = 8.2
Below I demonstrate numerically, echoing the earlier results using discrete neighbour-
hoods, that this outcome does not necessarily Pareto dominate the disaggregated de-
cision equilibrium in which households consume the Veblen good and separate into
reference neighbourhoods. This constitutes an important difference from the findings
of Eaton and Eswaran [2006].
4 Numerical analysis
This section demonstrates through simulations some of the features that have been de-
scribed analytically, and emphasises the diversity of possible outcomes given different
choices of parameters. Appendix F outlines the method used here for numerically con-
structing separating equilibria for the problem described in Section 3.6. The pooling
equilibria could not be characterised in closed form, so these have also been simulated
numerically by solving equation 35.
Figure 5 depicts equilibria for one sample set of parameters. The top left panel
shows the separating equilibrium distribution of household consumption h¯(w) = h(w)
as well as its mean value ¯¯h. Also shown is the rent p(w) paid for land by each type w
and its mean value r. For this economy, households all spend more on their housing
than they do on buying their way into a neighbourhood. Also shown for comparison
is the pooling equilibrium outcome hp(w); in this case all households spend less when
mixed in identical heterogenous neighbourhoods than when they are sorted into their
preferred reference groups.
The top right panel shows the dependence of leisure on type for the separating
equilibrium. In all cases, it is weakly concave and decreasing. The lower left panel
shows land price as a function of neighbourhood consumption. For the parameters
used in this case, the price is an increasing function of neighbourhood affluence.
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Figure 6: An equilibrium for which r > ¯¯h. Parameters: w ∈ (6.9,8.0),Φ= 2.3,Λ=
0.7,λ = 1.6,N = 1.0
The lower right panel shows welfare distributions for three scenarios: the separating
equilibrium (Usep), the pooling equilibrium (Upooling), and the planner’s economy
(Uplanner, see Section Section 3.14), in which no one consumes the Veblen good and
all households enjoy the maximum amount of leisure. The planner’s economy Pareto
dominates the pooling equilibrium but is preferred to the separating equilibrium only
by the lower types.
Figure 6 shows a case with several qualitative differences. For these parameters,
the land rent is a decreasing function of neighbourhood affluence, indicating that the
marginal cost of a higher local reference group outweighs the marginal benefit of a
higher-status neighbourhood.
The preferences in this example differ from those in Figure 5 in part by having a
much higher relative weight on local comparisons as compared with neighbourhood
comparisons; that is, N/Λλ is much smaller. In this case, the emphasis in preferences
on consumption comparison at the local level as compared with leisure is also high,
and the Veblen equilibrium is fully Pareto dominated by the planner’s outcome with no
Veblen good.26 The significance of allowing for endogenous reference group choice is
highlighted in this economy by the fact that households are spending more, on average,
on reference group selection — i.e., land — than on the underlying Veblen good itself.
Figure 7 shows a land rent schedule that is peaked at h¯ = NΛλ − ¯¯h (see Section 3.6).
The equilibrium also includes pooling neighbourhoods in which households with low
productivity choose not to work at all. In the case shown in Figure 8, every household
type consumes more Veblen good and suffers lower utility in the pooling equilibrium
than in the separating case. Both outcomes would be unanimously rejected in favour
of the planner’s allocation.
Figure 9 shows the effect on households of uniform growth in the economy. As
26No pooling equilibrium was found for this set of parameters.
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Figure 7: An equilibrium with non-monotonic price. Parameters: w∈ (2.2,21),Φ=
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Figure 8: An equilibrium in which all households prefer the separating equilib-
rium to the pooling one. Parameters: w ∈ (5.0,7.2),Φ = 0.9,Λ = 1.1,λ = 0.3,N =
1.4
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Figure 9: Total marginal change to welfare in an economy subject to uniform
growth. The solid line represents the case of Figure 5 on page 28, the dashed line
is the same case except that λ is decreased to 0.2, and the dotted line is the same case
except that Φ is increased to 1.
represented in equation (32) on page 24, the overall benefits of growth for a given
household may be positive or negative. The three cases shown in the figure illustrate
that the strength of the dependence of growth effects on w is proportional to λ and that
when households place a higher value on leisure, the effect of growth is worse for all.
5 Conclusion
Most of economic analysis is still predicated on the plausibility of fixed preferences
over absolute consumption. In this paper I take seriously the idea that absolute con-
sumption utility benefits are unlikely to be sensible to humans when modern consump-
tion levels are orders of magnitude higher in real terms than during the vast majority
of our evolutionary history. I take a modest step towards exploring some calculus of
choice and macroeconomic equilibria when preferences are, indeed, purely relative to
what we know and see and when, in addition, we are able to exert some choice over
what it is that we know and see.
By considering utility functions with a “pure Veblen” component this work ac-
counts for goods which are consumed conspicuously or “publicly” and therefore are
likely preferentially to affect neighbours in close proximity to the consumer. The ben-
efits of “privately” consumed goods are captured in the so-called “leisure” term, Φ(x),
which may encompass not only activities involving social engagement but also other
classes of relative preferences for which reference levels are set through means other
than the observation of local contemporaries. For instance, expectations about lifestyle
and consumption are influenced by advertising and by broad dissemination of cultural
norms.
It should above all be kept in mind that the empirical work which motivated this
investigation of relative consumption preferences indicates that market-oriented con-
sumption (as proxied by income) benefits are not only relative to others’ but are also
relatively insignificant for well-being as compared with the contribution from other
factors such as positive social engagement. Thus, the importance of social groups in
this work might correspond to the lesser of two significant roles: in a broader view,
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pursuit of social groups is important for the direct social benefits they confer as well as
for their influence on emulation behaviour through consumption externalities.
What can be learned from a purely theoretical investigation is limited. Neverthe-
less, even the extreme models presented here suggest some insights to add to those
developed in past work. Firstly, the allowance for heterogeneity and reference group
selection significantly modifies the characteristics of general equilibrium. When agents
have the tendency to use their own social group rather than a global one as a reference,
the ability to differentiate into like groups can lead to a more efficient outcome than
that of a heterogeneous mix of types, as evidenced by Figure 8. A general interpreta-
tion is that the existence of regional diversity can mitigate the extreme Veblen problem
described by Eaton and Eswaran [2006]. On the other hand, this mitigation is by no
means certain. In Figures 5 and 7, only the highest and lowest types prefer the separat-
ing equilibrium to the pooling one.
The most significant findings from this paper and some key differences from those
of Eaton and Eswaran [2006] are that (1) complete elimination of the Veblen good may
not be in everyone’s interest and (2) growth in productivity in the Veblen good industry
may be beneficial to some households. Even though the economy takes the form of a
“rat race” due to the existence of a pure Veblen good, the most wealthy and productive
households may actually prefer to have the good permitted on the market and prefer to
have policy geared towards increased productivity in producing it. These features are
shown, for example, in Figures 7 and 9. If the high types which benefit from the Veblen
economy also have a more than proportional share of influence over policy, they will
find it in their interest to promote the production of a completely “useless” good with
ever increasing efficiency.
The degree to which such preferences and consequent externalities form an impor-
tant part of the real economy remains an active empirical question, but the conclusions
from this exploration of heterogeneity and autonomous group selection suggest that one
should take seriously warnings given by Eaton and Eswaran [2006] about the canonical
assumptions and focus on material consumption growth by economists. If pursuit of
Veblen good economies is not pure folly, it is only wise from the point of view of the
wealthiest consumers.
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Appendices
This appendix provides detail and more in-depth discussion of several issues raised in
or tangential to the main body of the paper. Section A explains the relationship of this
work to the literature on club economies. Section B discusses some very simple mod-
els of heterogeneity and Veblen preferences which give intuition for the more general
case. Section C discusses the choice of functional forms used in the paper. Section E
outlines proofs of propositions stated earlier, and Section F describes how to construct
the separating equilibrium used in numerical examples.
A Endogenous reference groups are not club goods
There is a large existing literature on local public goods and agglomeration into clubs.
The problem I address here is distinct in a couple of ways. Neighbourhoods are unlike
clubs in that their membership does not explicitly choose an entry price, nor do they
coordinate (typically through a voting scheme, or just through coordination in the core
equilibrium) on the nature of the public good they provide. That is, I assume that
neighbourhoods do not set standards for how lawns and gardens must be kept or how
ornate new houses must be. Rather, in the models here the homogeneous behaviour
within neighbourhoods is a result only of relativities in preferences and possibly of the
individual ability to pay in a competitive market for land.
I also ignore for the moment congestion and the endogenous sizing of communities
or of lots of land, although these are clearly relevant to spatial development patterns.
A relevant observation is that in Canada the lowest density settlements are populated
by the richest and poorest. High density areas are populated by more median incomes,
presumably in urban high-rises.
Standard efficiency considerations for models of local public goods and “capitali-
sation” are not appropriate when the public goods are Veblen goods. Existing models
tend to focus on tax and price systems which afford efficient allocations within juris-
dictions and efficient location choice for individuals. Because I do not assume that
differentiation of types occurs on the same geographic scale as tax taking institutions
or those offering public services, I just ignore those policy instruments and look for
equilibria without them.
Although the models I consider below do not include actions of coordinated neigh-
bourhoods, insights from the work could inform local providers of public goods such
as neighbourhood associations, clubs, or local governments. Along with public good
problems, these groups face migration and changing distribution of local wealth, pres-
sures on land price, and economic growth, which are the key concepts to follow.
B An introduction to neighbourhood segregation in the
presence of Veblen goods
To introduce the ideas to come, consider a straightforward application of heterogeneity
to the Pure Veblen 1 formulation of Eaton and Eswaran [2006], as described below.
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B.1 Exogenous segregation and Veblen consumption
Let there be two types of household, differentiated only by their endowed labour pro-
ductivities, wH > wL. Preferences are generated by utility
U = F(x)+H(h− h¯)
where 0 < x < 1 is chosen leisure and the numeraire good, h, is purchased according to
the budget, h≤ w[1− x]. This good is a Veblen good in that its benefit is derived only
through consumption relative to a reference consumption level, h¯. We may imagine
that h measures a form of intrinsically useless conspicuous consumption such as living
in a grandiose house.27 In this model economy and several of those to follow, building
such houses is the only industry. The function H(·) then represents the status value of
living with consumption level h amongst neighbours with average consumption level
h¯.
One can begin by considering the welfare implications of inequality. Is society
better off with distinct types, wH and wL, segregated or integrated? If neighbourhoods
characterised by their averge consumption h¯ can be completely separated into homo-
geneous groups, then the utilities of the two types will be
U sL = F(x
s
L)+H(0)
U sH = F(x
s
H)+H(0)
whereas in a homogeneously mixed community, outcomes are, for the case of equal
populations in the two types,
UmL = F(x
m
L )+H (−∆) <U sL
UmH = F(x
m
H)+H (∆) >U
s
H
where ∆≡ 12 hmH − 12 hmL . The given inequalities follow if H(·) is strictly concave. They
indicate that the high types are better off in the integrated community while the low
types are worse off. Furthermore, concavity of both H(·) and F(·) implies that xmH > xsH
and xmL < x
s
L. That is, the high productivity individuals will work less in the integrated
community than in the segregated one, and conversely for the less productive type. In
addition, H (∆)+H (−∆)< 2H(0); that is, the summed benefits derived from housing
alone are higher in the segregated case. However, without specifying functional forms,
no definitive statement can be made about the relative efficiencies of the two cases on
the basis of summed utilities which include both leisure and housing.28
27Such “pure Veblen” goods represent the case when any intrinsic value to increased consumption of the
good suffers strongly from diminishing returns. Similar outcomes may be seen in the more general case
when both absolute and relative benefits accrue from consumption. When others’ consumption is roughly on
par with one’s own, the relative effects, or Veblen terms, remain while the absolute benefits saturate [Eaton
and Eswaran, 2006]. In the current context, all houses are large enough to satisfy needs and provide most
benefits that dwellings can provide their owners directly.
28Using the concept of “transferable utility” to justify the common practice of adding utilities and ordering
outcomes on the basis of social (i.e., aggregate) welfare may seem a dubious method when utility has its
normal modern interpretation as an abstract determinant of decision making. The widespread availability
now of measured subjective well-being, however, gives the current exercise the slightly more empirical
interpretation of comparing regional average life satisfaction levels under the two scenarios.
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Similarly, the efficiency implications of growth are ambiguous. In the segregated
case, growth in either wH or wL beyond some minimum level is unequivocally bad for
welfare, as in Eaton and Eswaran [2006]. On the other hand and in contrast to their ho-
mogeneous case, the implications of growth for the mixed community is indeterminate
without more assumptions.
Several of these ambiguities recur below when segregation is an endogenous out-
come. Rather than pursue welfare analysis for specific functional forms at this stage, I
consider next the implications of disaggregated choice in this simple economy in order
to motivate necessary subsequent extensions to the model.
B.2 Endogenous segregation without neighbourhood benefits
To continue the introduction of heterogeneity to the competitive Veblen economy de-
scribed in Eaton and Eswaran [2006], I now incorporate disaggregated decision mak-
ing in the two-neighbourhood world of Section B.1. Consider the case where multiple
neighbourhood locations exist and each household chooses where to live as well as
how much to spend on its own consumption of housing. Assume that households are
aware of the possibility of relocating, even though their consumption comparisons ex-
tend only to their own, chosen neighbours. This represents an endogenous choice of
reference group for the Veblen good.
For any form of utility U = F
(
x,v
(
h, h¯
))
with ∂U/∂ h¯ < 0, however, such neigh-
bourhood differentiation is not possible. The uniform undesirability of high-consumption
neighbours means that all decision makers will prefer the lowest available average
neighbourhood consumption h¯. That is, all types want to live with the poorest neigh-
bours. Even if there is a free market for land in different neighbourhoods, the most
able to buy are the most wealthy and therefore those with the least desirable exter-
nality to their neighbours. As a result, no differentiated neighbourhoods may exist in
equilibrium.
B.3 Neighbourhood benefits
A segregated equilibrium where migration is a choice can thus only exist if there is co-
ordination of some kind between members of a neighbourhood29 or if there is another,
countervailing externality acting in addition to the negative consumption externality
considered above.
That is, in order to explain why wealthy types and poor types might each prefer to
live amongst their own, there must be a neighbourhood benefit simultaneously with the
local consumption comparison. There are several obvious reasons for higher produc-
tivity neighbourhoods to be desirable:
1. Productivity w could be an exogenous feature of location rather than of the indi-
vidual; in cross-sectional or short-term studies this amounts to historical factors
which determine opportunity or availability of resources.
29For instance, to assess taxes or membership fees. I do not consider this possibility, which as mentioned
above is well covered by the literature on “club economies”.
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2. Neighbourhoods could be characterised by the intrinsic quality of their residents
in a way which confers either pecuniary benefits to neighbours (through higher
income opportunities due to networking or signaling) or social (non-wage) bene-
fits through higher quality social interactions or more efficient child-rearing and
home production.
3. Conspicuous consumption by neighbours (for instance and in particular, fancy
houses) could determine a common status value enjoyed by all residents of a
neighbourhood. In this case, the consumption comparison group is other neigh-
bourhoods in the region.
In Section 2, I begin by considering benefits of type 2 and later focus on a self-
consistent economy incorporating benefits of type 3. Either of these positive spillovers
within a neighbourhood may exist simultaneously with the negative spillovers due to
local, neighbour-to-neighbour consumption externalities.
One can imagine a model economy in which decision makers weigh these two
effects against each other in order to choose a place to live. A household’s choice
of neighbourhood will be optimal if the benefit from that neighbourhood less the con-
sumption externality suffered from living there is better than any other available option.
This is the decision problem if entry into each neighbourhood is free to anyone who
chooses it. I will show below that this scenario does not always lead to an economy
with more than one neighbourhood.
Alternatively, entry into a neighbourhood might have a further cost due to the price
of land. Whatever are the reasons behind the benefit from living in a particular location,
that benefit may be captured in land prices that arise endogenously in the economy; this
is known as capitalisation in the literature on club economies.30 When no differentiated
neighbourhoods are possible with free land, there may still be separated equilibria when
a land market exists. I address both cases of priced and unpriced land in the discussion
that follows.
Because the form of preferences under discussion, which incorporates relativities,
is unusual in economics, it will prove useful to explore some qualitative features using
simple functional forms which, based on experience with non-Veblen utility functions,
one might expect to be tractable. It turns out that a prominent feature of even simple
forms of preferences involving endogenous reference groups is that the utility function
is not globally concave. As a result, in many cases a desirable equilibrium does not
exist or exists only for special sets of parameters.
The next section introduces some functional forms used in subsequent analysis,
before building simple equilibria in which endogenous choice of reference groups leads
to differentiated neighbourhoods.
C Functional forms for Veblen preferences
Economists tend to use a narrow class of functional forms in parameterising utility.
These functions are selected for their convenient macroeconomic properties and they
30See Scotchmer [2002] for a review.
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typically have a domain restricted to positive values, which are appropriate for the
study of preferences over absolute consumption levels. When describing preferences
over relative consumption levels, these may be insufficient and new classes of functions
which tend to be unfamiliar to consumption theory may be useful.
Clark and Oswald [1998] point out that utility which is concave in relative con-
sumption leads to emulation, while comparison-convex utility leads to deviant be-
haviour. Tversky and Kahneman [1991]’s empirical findings on loss aversion might
be rationale for expressing comparison utilities using a form of sigmoid curve, easily
expressed using a hypertrigonometric form. The bounded extremes and slopes of such
a function are also conducive to efficient numerical simulation. However, not being
concave, sigmoid utility makes marginal analysis difficult.
Eaton and Eswaran [2006] consider two classes of comparison-concave utility.
These are general concave increasing functions of either a difference or a ratio of own
and average consumption levels. In the present work, I employ explicit forms for each
of these two classes.
H(h, h¯) = Λ log
(
1+h/h¯
)
and
H(h, h¯) =−Λexp(−λ [h− h¯])
Both forms are increasing, comparison-concave, and continuous for any nonnega-
tive h and positive h¯. Both are relatively simple and likely to have analytic tractability.
D Nonexistence of separating equilibrium for discrete
types model
In Section D.1, I introduce a slightly simplified utility form in which benefits from
neighbours’ consumption enters directly into the utility function, without comparison
to other neighbourhoods. Section D.2 analyses one functional form in this class of
utility functions, showing that there can be no equilibrium in which types separate.
Sections D.3-D.5 consider several variations on the story which play a role in the treat-
ment of a continuum of agent types in Section 3.
D.1 Direct neighbourhood benefits
This section formalises the endogenous reference group choice problem outlined above,
in which households derive benefit from their relative consumption of housing but their
absolute consumption of neighbourhood quality. Preferences are defined over leisure
x ≥ 0, the conspicuous extravagance h ≥ 0 of one’s house, and the average value h¯ of
houses in one’s choice of a neighbourhood.
Utility is, as before, additively separable into a leisure term F(·), a pure Veblen
term H(·) comparing own consumption with that of one’s chosen peers, and a further
absolute benefit N(·) derived from the consumption level of one’s chosen peers:
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U = F(x)+H(h, h¯)+N(h¯) (36)
The benefits represented by N(·) are derived through one of the first two channels
described in section Section B.3.
In maximising this utility function, an agent of type w is constrained by the budget
w[1− x]≥ h
Here F(·), H(·), and N(·) each obey standard convenient assumptions made con-
crete below. Given the optimality condition
x = 1−h/w (37)
the household’s decision problem may be reduced to a nested choice of an optimal
housing purchase h
?
(h¯) for each possible neighbourhood h¯, followed by a choice of
optimal neighbourhood h¯
?
. Holding h¯ fixed, U(h) is concave and its global optimum is
consistent with the first order condition
F ′(1− h
w
) = wHh(h, h¯) or h = 0 (38)
The indirect utility U(w, h¯) is then derived by substituting into the utility function
(36) the housing choice h
? (
h¯
)
which would be selected in a given neighbourhood with
average consumption h¯:
U(w, h¯) =U
(
w,h
? (
h¯
)
, h¯
)
(39)
If there is a discrete set of available neighbourhoods, each household must choose
the one offering the highest utility in (39). However, in order to gain insight into
the discrete choice optima, consider the case (treated further in Section 3) in which
a continuum of neighbourhoods is available. Then (39) presents a continuous choice
maximisation problem with no constraints on h¯. Notice, however, that there is no guar-
antee that this optimisation over h¯ is also characterised by a concave objective function.
The slope dU(w, h¯)/dh¯ may have a nonmonotonic dependence on h¯, meaning that the
global optimum may be difficult to find analytically. Moreover, a global maximum
does not necessarily even exist, since U(·) may be unbounded even subject to the bud-
get constraint equation (37).
One may understand this by noting that in the scenario described above there is
no direct cost to choosing one neighbourhood over another. Without a price for entry
to a neighbourhood, for instance in the form of a market for land that is independent
from the cost of constructing a house, it is possible for the benefit from having wealth-
ier neighbours to outweigh the penalty from having a relatively less desirable house
compared with the one next door.
With this caveat about existence in mind, I now define an equilibrium of interest
in which endogenously chosen reference groups are consistent with households being
sorted by type. To be more precise, consider a world with, as before, two types of
household differentiated only by their endowed labour productivities, wH > wL, and
two neighbourhoods into which individuals may move and build a house.
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Definition Then a discrete separating Nash equilibrium is a set of allocations {hL ≡ h(wL),
h¯L ≡ h¯(wL), hH ≡ h(wH), h¯H ≡ h¯(wH)
}
satisfying the necessary optimality conditions
for each type w
h¯(w) = h¯?(w)
h(w) = h?(w, h¯?(w))
and the consistency condition
h¯(w) = h(w) (40)
This last condition states that a neighbourhood’s average consumption level h¯ is equal
to the consumption choice h of its residents.
It turns out that this equilibrium, in which types sort themselves into distinct neigh-
bourhoods, is not possible for some preferences such as the one described next.
D.2 “Log-log-log” preferences with two types
Consider the following particular case of utility given in equation (36):
F(x) = Φ log(x)
H(h, h¯) = Λ log
(
1+
h
h¯
)
N(h¯) = N log
(
h¯
)
That is, let
U(x,h, h¯) =Φ log(x)+Λ log
(
1+
h
h¯
)
+N log
(
h¯
)
(41)
The optimal choice of housing within a given neighbourhood takes the simple form
h
?
(w, h¯) = max
{
0,
Λw−Φh¯
Φ+Λ
}
(42)
with the corresponding leisure choices31 given by equation (37):
x
?
(w, h¯) =Φ
1+ h¯/w
Φ+Λ
(43)
Equation (42) states that households will choose to consume less (and enjoy more
leisure) when their neighbours consume more. This substitution effect between neigh-
bours’ consumption and own consumption is a counterintuitive effect for a Veblen
good.
Substituting these values into equation (41) generates the indirect utility U(w, h¯)
for each household type w. For interior solutions,
31Note that despite the superficial appearance of (41), the preferences do not conform to a Cobb-Douglas
type, and the optimal allocation to leisure is not independent of others’ allocations.
40
U(w, h¯) = log
([
Φ
Φ+Λ
]Φ [ Λ
Φ+Λ
]Λ)
(44)
+Φ log
(
1+
h¯
w
)
+Λ log
(
1+
w
h¯
)
+N log
(
h¯
)
The household’s problem involves finding the best choice amongst two alternative
neighbourhoods h¯ available in equilibrium. This goal, or finding a global optimum
value h¯?(w) for this continuous equation, are both nontrivial tasks because U(w, h¯) is
not concave. Moreover, I next show that a separating equilibrium cannot exist.
Proposition D.1. When group entry (land) is costless and preferences are given by
equation (41), there is no discrete separating group Nash equilibrium with two types.
A proof is given on page 46 in an Appendix. The only endogenous choice equilib-
rium is an unsorted one in which all households end up pooling in the same reference
group, characterised by the average value of housing consumption. For instance, if
productivities are high enough to avoid corner choices, there is a pooling equilibrium
where h¯ is given by equation (50) with w replaced by its population average.
In order to understand this result more intuitively, it is useful to consider the contin-
uous properties of equation (44) in further detail. A significant feature of the indirect
utility U(w, h¯) is that it is in general neither monotonic nor concave in the choice of
neighbourhood h¯. The marginal utility of a shift in neighbourhood consumption is
derived from equation (44):
dU
dh¯
=
1
w+ h¯
[
Φ+N+[N−Λ] w
h¯
]
(45)
When neighbourhood benefits are valued highly enough in comparison with local
relative consumption, N > Λ and U(w, h¯) is strictly increasing in h¯. In that case, the
lower type will always prefer to move up to the higher type’s neighbourhood when the
two are separated.
If instead Λ > N, utility is initially decreasing but eventually increasing with h¯.
According to equation (45), utility is in this case unbounded as h¯→ 0 and as h¯→ ∞
and has a minimum value Umin at
h¯minU =
Λ−N
Φ+N
w (46)
Because both h¯eq and h¯minU scale directly with w, households occupying their sep-
arating equilibrium neighbourhoods will always either both prefer any higher neigh-
bourhood to their own or both prefer any lower neighbourhood to their own. Thus it is
impossible for both types to fulfill the equilibrium requirements.
Figure 10 on page 43 shows the possible cases for preferences conforming to equa-
tion (41). The left panels show the dependence of the indirect utility on the neigh-
bourhood location h¯ for the high type (red) and low type (green). The dependence
is characterised by a minimum value which is proportional to the endowments w, in
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accordance with equation (46). Marked on each plot as hL and hH are the values h¯eq
for which a type’s housing choice is consistent with that of its neighbours, i.e., where
h
?
(h¯) = h¯. The right panels show indifference contours for U(h, h¯) for two values of w.
The dashed lines indicate the optimum housing choice h
?
(h¯) within each neighbour-
hood h¯. The dotted line is the solution to h = h¯, the blue squares show the values of
h¯eq, and the red and green squares show each type’s optimal choice of h in the other
type’s neighbourhood.
In (a), the left panel shows that h¯eq is to the left of h¯minU for both types. Hence
both types prefer to move to a less affluent neighbourhood and, in accordance with
equation (42) and equation (43), to build a slightly smaller house and to consume less
leisure. Because such a move is available to the high type, the h¯eq values do not consti-
tute an equilibrium. The right hand panel shows that the optimal housing consumption
h
?
(h¯) passes near a saddle point in the utility function U(h, h¯).
Figure 10(b) shows the opposite case, when h¯eq is greater than h¯minU and thus the
low-type household prefers to move locations. Panels (c) are the same as (b) with the
values of Λ and N reversed such that N >Λ. In this case, U(w, h¯) is increasing in h¯ and
a move to a higher expenditure neighbourhood is always beneficial.
D.3 Mixed strategies
For simplicity, equation (40) describes a pure strategy equilibrium. A less restrictive
definition of equilibrium in which mixed strategies are allowed would require only that
for each neighbourhood j,
h¯n = 〈h〉residents(n) (47)
where the average 〈·〉 is taken over all residents in the neighbourhood. This weaker
condition will still not admit any separating outcome in which different types tend
to live in different neighbourhoods. This is because for either type to be indifferent
between two neighbourhoods, the neighbourhoods must have identical h¯ and hence
identical mixtures of the two types of household, resulting in a pooling equilibrium.
D.4 Neighbourhood benefits compared with other neighbourhoods
In equation (41), the functional form of N(·) provides unbounded benefits from con-
sumption of the public good h¯ while H(·) represents a bounded cost of Veblen com-
parison as h¯ becomes large. As a result, households will always prefer moving to a
sufficiently high-consumption neighbourhood rather than remain in their own.
An alternate specification of preferences pertains to neighbourhood status benefits
of type 3 on page 37 and is also more consistent with the empirical results outlined in
Section 1. In this functional form, the neighbourhood consumption h¯ confers utility
only through comparison to a yet broader average consumption, ¯¯h, which may be taken
to be the average over all neighbourhoods. A new consistency condition states this
additional relationship,
¯¯h =
〈
h¯
〉
and the comparison between neighbourhoods is captured in the final term of the utility
function, N(h¯, ¯¯h). For instance, a form similar to that analysed in Section D.2 is
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(a) Case with h¯eq < h¯minU: Φ= 9,Λ= 16, N = 6
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(b) Case with h¯eq > h¯minU: Φ= 6,Λ= 7, N = 4.5
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(c) Case with N > Λ: Φ= 6,Λ= 4.5, N = 7
Figure 10: Non-existence of separating equilibrium. No separating equilibrium ex-
ists for “log-log-log” preferences given by equation (41). In all cases shown, wL = 3
and wH = 6.
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U(x,h, h¯) =Φ log(x)+Λ log
(
1+
h
h¯
)
+N log
(
1+
h¯
¯¯h
)
(48)
This utility function provides a more natural limit to the benefit obtained in equilib-
rium from neighbourhood consumption when the number of neighbourhoods is finite.
Nevertheless, it is shown on page 47 in Appendix E that there is still no separating
equilibrium for households with these preferences. The proof is similar to the case of
absolute benefits, above.
D.5 “Log-log-exp” preferences with two types
In this section and the next, other convenient functional forms described in Section C
are used to vary the qualitative assumptions on utility. Using the inverse exponential
form for N(·) imposes a bound on the benefits from living in an affluent neighbourhood,
which may be a more defensible assumption and circumvents one apparent problem
with the specification give in equation (41). For simplicity, consider again the case in
which N(·) depends only on absolute consumption of one’s neighbours, but now with
the following form:
U(x,h, h¯) =Φ log(x)+Λ log
(
1+
h
h¯
)
−N exp(−ν h¯) (49)
Topologically this form is richer than equation (41), with multiple inflection points
in the indirect utility U(w, h¯). Numerical analysis indicates that it also is incompatible
with a separating equilibrium. Figure 11 on page 45 shows some parameter sets for
which in (a) both types prefer to switch neighbourhoods if assigned to their h¯eq, and
in (b) the high type prefers to switch and the low type prefers to stay.
E Proofs
Proposition E.1. (Decreasing leisure in economy with a continuum of types) If F(x)
is concave and either (a) H(h, h¯) takes the form H = f
(
h− h¯) or (b) H(h, h¯) takes
the form H = f
(
h
h¯
)
and p = 0, then leisure x is decreasing in w amongst interior
equilibria.
Proof. For interior equilibria, F ′(x) = wHh(h, h¯) and h = h¯∀w. When H = f
(
h− h¯),
taking a derivative gives
dx
dw
=
f ′0
F ′′
< 0
For H = f
(
h
h¯
)
,
dx
dw
=
f ′0
h¯F ′′
[
1− dh¯
dw
]
and if p(h¯) = 0,
dh¯
dw
= 1− x−w dx
dw
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(a) Case with Φ= 4, Λ= 4, N = 10, ν = 2, wL ≈ 2.5, and wH ≈ 5
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(b) Case with Φ= 3, Λ= 10, N = 17, ν = 3, wL = 1, and wH = 2
Figure 11: Non-existence of separating equilibrium. No separating equilibrium ex-
ists for “log-log-exp” preferences given by equation (49).
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Combining these expressions gives
dx
dw
=
1− x
F ′′− f ′0h¯ w2
< 0
Proposition D.1 on page 41.
Proof. According to equation (42) and equation (40), the interior equilibrium choices
of type w can be written:
heq = h¯eq =
Λ
2Φ+Λ
w (50)
xeq =
2Φ
2Φ+Λ
(51)
This says that whenever a separating equilibrium exists, households of type w will
always be seen to populate the same kind of neighbourhood, regardless of which other
types also exist.
First, note that the equilibrium cannot include corner allocations. According to
equation (42), the choice of h is interior whenever h¯ ≤ ΛΦw. Since h¯eq given in equa-
tion (50) always satisfies h¯eq ≤ ΛΦw and since, again according to equation (42), h? > 0
if h¯ = 0, allocations in the separating equilibrium must be interior.
Now, a sufficient condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium is that each
type prefers to remain in its own neighbourhood. Formally, the net benefit ∆U from
moving to the other available neighbourhood and choosing a new level of housing there
must be negative for each type:
∆UL ≡U
(
wL, h¯H
)−U (wL, h¯L) ≤ 0 and (52)
∆UH ≡U
(
wH , h¯L
)−U (wH , h¯H) ≤ 0 (53)
where h¯L and h¯H are the equilibrium neighbourhood housing choices in equation (50).
These conditions can be evaluated using equation (44) with the convenient notation
Θ≡ wHwL > 1 and B≡ heq/w =
Λ
2Φ+Λ < 1:
∆UL = Φ log
(
1+
hH
wL
)
+Λ log
(
1+
wL
hH
)
+N log(hH)
−Φ log
(
1+
hL
wL
)
−Λ log
(
1+
wL
hL
)
−N log(hL)
= Φ log
(
1+BΘ
1+B
)
+Λ log
(
1+1/BΘ
1+1/B
)
+N log(Θ)
= Φ log
(
1+BΘ
1+B
)
+Λ log
(
1
Θ
1+BΘ
1+B
)
+N log(Θ)
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= [Φ+Λ] log
(
1+BΘ
1+B
)
+[N−Λ] log(Θ) (54)
Similarly,
∆UH = Φ log
(
1+
hL
wH
)
+Λ log
(
1+
wH
hL
)
+N log(hL)
−Φ log
(
1+
hH
wH
)
−Λ log
(
1+
wH
hH
)
−N log(hH)
= Φ log
(
1+B/Θ
1+B
)
+Λ log
(
1+Θ/B
1+1/B
)
−N log(Θ)
= Φ log
(
1
Θ
B+Θ
1+B
)
+Λ log
(
B+Θ
1+B
)
−N log(Θ)
= [Φ+Λ] log
(
B+Θ
1+B
)
− [N+Φ] log(Θ)
Note that the first term in equation (54) must be positive, since Θ > 1. Whenever
N >Λ the second term is also positive and ∆UL > 0, which means that the low type will
always prefer to move up to the high types’s neighbourhood. This makes the separating
equilibrium impossible when N < Λ, i.e. for agents who value neighbourhood-level
benefits sufficiently more than they value their status within a neighbourhood.
The two terms of ∆UH can also be unambiguously signed; the first is always posi-
tive and the second always negative. I now show that when the low types are content
in their neighbourhood, the high types cannot be content in theirs.
A necessary equilibrium condition follows from combining the two inequalities in
equation (52) and equation (53) into the weaker requirement that
∆UH +∆UL ≤ 0
which becomes
∆UL+∆UH = [Φ+Λ] log
(
1+BΘ
1+B
)
+[N−Λ] log(Θ)
+[Φ+Λ] log
(
B+Θ
1+B
)
− [N+Φ] log(Θ)
= [Φ+Λ] log
(
1+BΘ
1+B
B+Θ
1+B
1
Θ
)
= [Φ+Λ] log
(
Θ
[
1+B2
]
+
[
Θ+ 1Θ
]
BΘ
Θ [1+B2]+2BΘ
)
(55)
Because Θ+ 1Θ > 2 for all Θ > 1, the argument of log in equation (55) is always
greater than 1; thus ∆UL+∆UH > 0. Therefore, there is no separating equilibrium.
Proposition E.2. When group entry (land) is costless and preferences are given by
equation (48), there is no discrete separating group Nash equilibrium with two types.
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Proof. The proof closely resembles that of Proposition D.1; differences are noted here.
Let the equilibrium neighbourhoods be hL and hH according to equation (50). The
global reference level can then be expressed
¯¯h = Λ
wL+wH
2Λ+4φ
The conditions for an equilibrium then become:
∆UL = [Φ+Λ] log
(
Φ+Λ 12 [1+Θ]
Φ+Λ
)
−Λ log(Θ)+N log( 1+3Θ3+Θ )≤ 0
∆UH =− [Φ+Λ] log
(
Φ+Λ
Φ+Λ 12 [1+ 1Θ ]
)
+Λ log(Θ)−N log( 1+3Θ3+Θ )≤ 0
Again, a weaker necessary condition that follows from combining these two in-
equalities, ∆UH ≤ 0≤−∆UL, is that
∆UH +∆UL ≤ 0
∆UH +∆UL = [Φ+Λ] log
(
Φ+Λ 12
[
1+ 1Θ
]
Φ+Λ
Φ+Λ 12 [1+Θ]
Φ+Λ
)
= [Φ+Λ] log
(
Φ2+ΦΛ 12
[
2+Θ+ 1Θ
]
+Λ2 14
[
2+ 1Θ +Θ
]
Φ2+2ΦΛ+Λ2
)
≤ 0
Because Θ+ 1Θ > 2 for all Θ > 1, the argument of log is always greater than 1 and
therefore the above inequality is impossible. There is no separating equilibrium.
Lemma E.3. (A useful exponential form) Let Ψ(a,b) ≡ 1b − aeab−1 . Then for a and
b positive, limb→0Ψ(a,b) = 12 a and Ψ(a,b) is always positive. For Ψ(−a,b) = 1b −
a
1−e−ab and a and b positive, limb→0Ψ(−a,b) =− 12 a and Ψ(−a,b) is always negative.
Furthermore, dΨ(a,b)da > 0,
dΨ(a,b)
db < 0,
dΨ(−a,b)
da < 0,
dΨ(−a,b)
db < 0.
Proof. For a > 0, b > 0, the function b ·Ψ(a,b) is nonnegative iff ab ≤ eab− 1. For
ab= 0, this is an equality. For ab> 0, the slope of the right hand side strictly dominates
the slope of the left hand side. Therefore the inequality holds for all ab≥ 0. By similar
reasoning, the inequality ab≥ 1− e−ab holds for all positive ab.
Using a Taylor expansion to find the limits,
Ψ(a,b) =
1
b
− a
ab+ 12 a
2b2+ 13! a
3b3+ . . .
=
b+ 12 ab
2+ 13! a
2b3+ . . . −b
b2+ 12 ab
3+ 13! a
2b4+ . . .
=
1
2 a+
1
3! a
2b+ . . .
1+ 12 ab+
1
3! a
2b2+ . . .
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→
{
0 as a→ 0
1
2 a as b→ 0
A similar transformation finds the limits for Ψ(−a,b). The above results can be
used to sign the first derivatives as follows:
d
da
Ψ(a,b) = − 1
eab−1 +
abeab
[eab−1]2
= − 1
eab−1
[
1− ab
1− e−ab
]
= − 1
eab−1Ψ(−ab, 1)> 0
and
d
db
Ψ(a,b) = − 1
b2
+
a2eab
[eab−1]2
= − 1
b2
+
a2
[eab−1] [1− e−ab]
= − 1
b2
+
a2
eab+ e−ab−2
= − 1
b2
+
a2
2a2b2
2! +
2a4b4
4! +
2a6b6
6! . . .
a2
eab+ e−ab−2
= − 1
b2
[
1− 1
1+ 2a2b24! +
2a4b4
6! + . . .
]
< 0
For the modified function Ψ(−a,b), both derivatives are negative:
d
da
Ψ(−a,b) = − 1
1− e−ab −
abe−ab
[1− e−ab]2
= − 1
1− e−ab
[
1+
ab
eab−1
]
< 0
and
d
db
Ψ(−a,b) = − 1
b2
[
1− 1
1+ 2a2b24! +
2a4b4
6! + . . .
]
< 0
It follows from these monotonic properties that Ψ(a,b) ∈ (0, 12 a) and Ψ(−a,b) ∈
(− 12 a,0).
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F Construction of equilibrium
This section outlines the steps taken to compute a separating equilibrium in the nu-
merical examples to follow. Given exogenous parameters including the range of types
wL, wH , values for x(w), wm = max{wL,w0}, ¯¯h, and r− p0 can be directly computed
from equations (19), (20), (25), and (26). From these, the remaining allocations h¯(w)
follow using (24) . What remains is to calculate a price schedule p(h¯).
In order to select a value of p0 sufficiently high to clear the market both for the
most affluent desired neighbourhoods, i.e., p
(
h¯(wH)
)
> 0, and for the least affluent
neighbourhood, i.e., p(h¯min) ≥ 0, limiting values of p0 for both conditions must be
calculated and the higher of the two adopted. First, to ensure that there is a nonnegative
price for the highest type, I impose h¯max = h¯(wH) and p(h¯max) = 0 in (21), giving
h¯max = r+wH −w0
Then (23) can be evaluated at this upper limit in order to solve for p0:
0 = p(h¯max) = p0− h¯max+ NΛλ log
(
1+
h¯max
¯¯h
)
N
Λλ
log
(
1+
r+wH −w0
¯¯h
)
= [r− p0+wH −w0]
1+
r+wH −w0
¯¯h
= exp
(
Λλ
N
[r− p0+wH −w0]
)
r = ¯¯h
[
exp
(
Λλ
N
[r− p0+wH −w0]
)
−1
]
+w0−wH
Hence,
p0 = r− [r− p0]
= ¯¯h
[
exp
(
Λλ
N
[r− p0+wH −w0]
)
−1
]
+w0−wH − [r− p0] (56)
Since the value of [r− p0] is already calculated in terms of exogenous parameters (56)
provides a lower bound on the constant p0. To calculate a second lower bound satisfy-
ing the condition p(h¯min) = 0, note that the consumption level implied by this condition
is h¯min = r. Thus, the minimum p0 can again be calculated in terms of [r− p0]:
0 = p(r)
= p0− r+ NΛλ log
(
1+
r
¯¯h
)
N
Λλ
log
(
1+
r
¯¯h
)
= r− p0
1+
p0+[r− p0]
¯¯h
= exp
(
[r− p0]ΛλN
)
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= p0+[r− p0]− NΛλ log
(
1+
p0+[r− p0]
¯¯h
)
→ 1+ p0+[r− p0]¯¯h
= exp
(
[r− p0]ΛλN
)
p0 = ¯¯h
[
exp
(
[r− p0]ΛλN
)
−1
]
− [r− p0] (57)
For r− p0 sufficiently high for a real solution h¯(w), above, a market-clearing price
schedule can now be found by setting p0 to the larger of the two values in (56) and
(57). The price schedule follows from (23).
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